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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Overview and Results 
In 2009, ten Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states began the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(known as RGGI), the country’s first market-based program to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) from power plants.  Understanding the program’s performance and outcomes is important 
given that RGGI states account for one-sixth of the population in the US and one-fifth of the nation’s 
gross domestic product.  Through the development of the RGGI program, these states have gained 
first-mover policy experience and have collaborated to merge a common policy into well-functioning 
electricity markets.  Insights and observations gleaned from an analysis of the program’s performance 
will be valuable in evaluating past policy decisions and future policy recommendations. 
RGGI has now been operating for nearly three years. The rights to emit CO2 have been auctioned off. 
Power plant owners have spent roughly $912 million to buy CO2 allowances. Consumers now pay 
regional electricity rates that reflect a price on CO2 emissions. These emissions have gone down, 
affected by both RGGI and larger economic conditions.1 States have received, programmed, and 
disbursed virtually all the $912 million in allowance proceeds2 back into the economy in myriad ways 
– on energy efficiency measures, community-based renewable power projects, assistance to low-
income customers to help pay their electricity bills, education and job training programs, and even 
contributions to a state’s general fund. Figure ES1 shows RGGI proceeds by state and region.  
Looking back, how has the RGGI program affected electricity markets, power producers’ costs, 
electricity prices, and consumers’ electricity bills? What happened to the $912 million in proceeds 
from the sale of CO2 allowances? Has the program produced net economic benefits to these states in 
its first three years, or otherwise helped them pursue their goals for “continued overall economic 
growth” and reliable electric supply, while also reducing CO2 emissions? What has been learned to 
date? These are the principal questions this study set out to address.  
At the request of four foundations,3 Analysis Group has measured the economic impacts of RGGI’s 
first three years. Our analysis tracks the path of RGGI-related dollars as they leave the pockets of 
generators who buy CO2 allowances, show up in electricity prices and customer bills, make their way 
into state expenditure accounts, and then roll out into the economy in one way or another. Our 
analysis is unique in this way – it focuses on the actual impacts of economic activity: known CO2 
allowance prices; observable CO2 auction results; dollars distributed to the RGGI states; actual state-
government decisions about how to spend the allowance proceeds; measurable reductions in energy 
                                                     
1 RGGI, Inc. has reported that between 2008 and 2009, electric generation from RGGI-affected electric generation sources decreased by 
17.9 million MWh, or 9.1 percent. During that same time period CO2 emissions from RGGI electric generation sources decreased by 27.6 
million short tons, or 18.4 percent. “CO2 Emissions from Electricity Generation and Imports in the 10-State Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative: 2009 Monitoring Report,” RGGI, Inc., September 14, 2011. 
2 Of the $912 million paid for CO2 allowances (through 13 auctions from Q3 2008 through Q3 2011 and through a small amount of direct 
sales to qualifying emitters), 0.7 percent was used for administering the RGGI program; the remaining proceeds were disbursed to the 
RGGI states. 
3 The foundations are the Merck Family Fund, the Barr Foundation, the Chorus Foundation, and the Henry P. Kendall Foundation. 
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use from energy efficiency programs funded by RGGI dollars; traceable impacts of such expenditures 
on prices within the power sector; and concrete value added to the economy. By carefully examining 
the states’ implementation of RGGI to date, based on real data, we hope to provide a solid foundation 
for observations that can be used by others in future program design and to inform deliberations about 
RGGI going forward.  
Figure ES1 
RGGI Allowance Proceeds by State 
 
 
What happened to the dollars? First, RGGI produced $1.6 billion in net present value (NPV) 
economic value added to the ten-state region.4 The region’s economy – and each state’s as well – 
benefits from the RGGI program expenditures. When spread across the region’s population, these 
economic impacts amount to nearly $33 per capita in the region.5 Figure ES2 shows the net economic 
                                                     
4 This reflects a 3 percent social discount rate to put benefits and costs occurring in different time frames into a common reference point, 
which is 2011. We present results using the public rate in the body of this report, while noting the private rate results and providing further 
details in the Appendix. All figures show 2011 dollars discounted using a 3 percent social discount rate, unless otherwise noted. 
5 Using a 7 percent private discount rate, RGGI produced $1.0 billion in net economic value, amounting to nearly $21 per capita in the 
region. 
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value broken out by the macroeconomic effects of the impacts of RGGI on consumers and power 
plant owners, as well as effects that flow from direct spending of RGGI allowance revenues. 
Figure ES2 
Net Economic Impact to States in the RGGI Region (2011$) 
 
 
This economic benefit reflects the complex ways that RGGI dollars interact with local economies: the 
states’ use of RGGI auction proceeds on programs leads to more purchases of goods and services in 
the economy (e.g., engineering services for energy audits, more sales of energy efficiency equipment, 
labor for installing solar panels, dollars spent to train those installers and educators, and so forth). 
Together, these dollar flows have direct and indirect multiplier effects locally and regionally.  
RGGI has also produced changes in consumers’ overall expenditures on electricity. Although CO2 
allowances tend to increase electricity prices in the near term, there is also a lowering of prices over 
time because the states invested a substantial amount of the allowance proceeds on energy efficiency 
programs that reduce electricity consumption.6 After the early impacts of small electricity price 
                                                     
 
6 During the 2009–2011 period, we estimate that RGGI increased consumers’ overall payments for electricity by 0.7 percent; over the long 
run, however, this investment, which states used to support a variety of economic activity (of which approximately 48 percent went to 
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increases, consumers gain because their overall electricity bills go down as a result of this investment 
in energy efficiency. All told, electricity consumers overall – households, businesses, government 
users, and others – enjoy a net gain of nearly $1.1 billion, as their overall electric bills drop over 
time.7 This reflects average savings of $25 for residential consumers, $181 for commercial 
consumers, and $2,493 for industrial consumers over the study period. Consumers of natural gas and 
heating oil saved another $174 million. Figure ES3 shows the net bill reductions to consumers.  
Figure ES3 
Net Bill Reductions to Consumers (2011$) 
 
Although power plant owners have to purchase CO2 allowances, they recover all of their early 
expenditures through the increase in electricity prices during the 2009–2011 period; in the long run, 
however, RGGI-driven energy efficiency leads to lower sales of electricity, which ends up eroding 
power plant owners’ electric market revenues. On an NPV basis, RGGI means that, in total, the 
power generation sector will experience a decrease in revenues of $1.6 billion.8 Figure ES4 shows the 
                                                     
support energy efficiency programs) led to net savings in electricity bills to all consumers in all states, relative to an electric system that did 
not include RGGI for the 2009–2011 period.  
7 Using a 7 percent private discount rate, RGGI produced an overall net bill reduction of nearly $600 billion to consumers. 
8 Using a 7 percent private discount rate, the decrease in net revenues to power plant owners is $1.3 billion. 
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net revenue impact on power plant owners. Among the power plant owners, RGGI afforded a 
competitive advantage to power plants with lower CO2 emissions.  
Figure ES4 
Net Revenue Change for Power Plant Owners (2011$) 
 
Second, the scope of RGGI’s positive economic benefits varies by state and region, in large part 
because the states spent the RGGI allowance proceeds differently.9 Different expenditures have 
different multiplier effects in their economies and different impacts on their electric systems. For 
example, a state’s use of RGGI dollars to reduce energy use in the electric sector lightened the early-
years’ cost impact for electricity consumers by turning the RGGI program into a down payment on 
lower overall bills for electricity in the longer-term. The New England states, for example, spent 
much of their RGGI dollars on energy efficiency programs, and so New England’s electric system 
realizes overall benefits from RGGI, even before looking at the macroeconomic impacts. In the other 
regions, use of RGGI dollars to pay for general-taxpayer-funded programs ends up transferring 
                                                     
9 Overall, the distribution of spending across the states was as follows: 48 percent on energy efficiency and other utility programs; 20 
percent on general fund and other government support; 14 percent on bill-payment assistance to energy consumers; 9 percent on other 
greenhouse gas programs and program administration; 7 percent on renewable energy projects; and 2 percent on education, outreach, and 
job training. Individual state’s expenditures ranged significantly across these categories. 
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dollars from the electric system to the other sectors of the economy. The gains in the larger economy 
(from re-circulating RGGI auction proceeds broadly) offset the negative impacts in the electric sector 
in these other RGGI states (New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland (in PJM)).  
Also, the ten RGGI states reside in one of three “electrical regions,” each with a different generating 
mix. The extent of a state/region’s reliance on natural gas and other forms of low-carbon electric 
generation (such as nuclear and renewables) lessens the impact of CO2 allowance purchases on prices. 
Practically speaking, this means that New York and the New England states experience lower price 
impacts than Maryland, New Jersey, and Delaware.  
Insights and Observations 
These patterns, and the others described in more detail in our report, suggest a number of themes 
emerging from the RGGI experience to date. Some are important for providing the RGGI states with 
information about how the policy is performing relative to some (but not all) of its original goals. The 
observations are also relevant to other states and national policy makers if and when they decide to 
adopt a CO2 control program.   
Mandatory, Market-Based Carbon Control Mechanisms Are Functioning Properly and 
Can Deliver Positive Economic Benefits 
Based on the initial three years of experience from the nation’s first mandatory carbon control 
program, market-based programs are providing positive economic impacts while meeting emission 
objectives. The pricing of carbon in Northeast and Mid-Atlantic electricity markets has been seamless 
from an operational point of view and successful from an economic perspective. 
The States Have Used CO2 Allowance Proceeds Creatively – Supporting Diverse 
Policy and Economic Outcomes  
The states’ use of allowance proceeds not only provides economic benefits, but also has helped them 
meet a wide variety of social, fiscal, and environmental policy goals, such as addressing state and 
municipal budget challenges, assisting low-income customers, achieving advanced energy policy 
goals, and restoring wetlands, among other things.   
RGGI Has Reduced the Region’s Payments for Out-Of-State Fossil Fuels  
RGGI helped lower the total dollars these states sent outside their region in the form of payments for 
fuel by over $765 million. Most of the RGGI states’ electricity comes from fossil fuels, even though 
these states produce virtually no coal, natural gas, or oil locally. Since RGGI helped the states lower 
total fossil-fired power production and lower use of natural gas and oil for heating, RGGI reduced the 
total dollars sent out of state for energy resources.  
 PAGE 6  
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The Design of the CO2 Market in the RGGI States Affects the Size, Character, and 
Distribution of Public Benefits 
The joint decision by the RGGI states to make their CO2 allowances available to the market through a 
unified auction ended up generating substantial revenues for public use. This approach transferred 
emissions rights from the public sector to the private sector at a monetary cost (rather than 
transferring them for free). Had these allowances been given away for free, the states would not have 
had the benefit of the auction proceeds, and instead would have transferred that economic value to 
owners of power plants (which in the RGGI region are merchant generators, not owned by electric 
distribution utilities). In the end, the combination of the cap level, the design of the auction 
mechanism, and the depressed economy, reduced the challenge of meeting the RGGI cap, and CO2 
allowance prices decreased over time. Decreasing allowance prices also made it harder for power 
plant owners to recoup early purchase of higher-priced allowances, and reduced the funding available 
for public investment.  
How Allowance Proceeds Are Used Affects Their Economic Impacts  
The RGGI Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) fully anticipates – if not encourages – states to 
place different weights on economic, environmental, social, energy security, and other goals as they 
implement the program. But from a strictly economic perspective, some uses of proceeds clearly 
deliver economic returns more readily and substantially than others. For example, RGGI investment 
in energy efficiency depresses regional electrical demand, power prices, and consumer payments for 
electricity. This benefits all consumers through downward pressure on wholesale prices, yet it 
particularly benefits those consumers who actually take advantage of such programs, implement 
energy efficiency measures, and lower both their overall energy use and monthly energy bills. These 
savings stay in the pocket of electricity users. But positive macroeconomic impacts exist as well: the 
lower energy costs flow through the economy as collateral reductions in natural gas and oil 
consumption in buildings and increased consumer disposable income (from fewer dollars spent on 
energy bills), lower payments to out-of-state energy suppliers, and increased local spending or 
savings. Consequently, there are multiple ways that investments in energy efficiency lead to positive 
economic impacts; this reinvestment thus stands out as the most economically beneficial use of RGGI 
dollars. Other uses also provide macroeconomic benefits, even if they do not show up in the 
consumers’ pocket in the form of lower energy bills. 
RGGI Produced New Jobs  
Taking into account consumer gains, lower producer revenues, and net positive macroeconomic 
impacts, RGGI led to overall job increases amounting to thousands of new jobs over time. RGGI job 
impacts may in some cases be permanent; others may be part-time or temporary. But according to our 
analysis, the net effect is that the first three years of RGGI led to over 16,000 new “job years,”10 with 
                                                     
 
10 In the context of the entire workforce in the ten-state RGGI region, 16,000 new job-years is small (about 1/10th of one percent of the total 
employment in September 2011). But considering the fact that the ten states’ civilian labor force dropped by 73,400 from September 2010 
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each of the ten states showing net job additions. Jobs related to RGGI activities are located around the 
economy, with examples including engineers who perform efficiency audits; workers who install 
energy efficiency measures in commercial buildings; staff performing teacher training on energy 
issues; or the workers in state-funded programs that might have been cut had a state not used RGGI 
funds to close budget gaps.  
Timing Differences in Program Costs versus Benefits Affects Results 
Lags between CO2 allowance auctions and the expenditure of allowance proceeds back into the 
economy can significantly delay the realization of benefits. The delay stems from the time it takes 
RGGI, Inc. to administer allowance auctions and transfer proceeds to states, for the states to distribute 
funds to the program agencies and make grants to recipients, and then for the grant recipients to put 
those funds to productive use in the economy. Inevitably, the various steps in this programmatic chain 
follow after the time period in which the purchases of allowances end up in electricity prices. Because 
the first step of transferring auction proceeds to the states occurs quite quickly, deliberate efforts by 
states to re-circulate the funds back into the economy as quickly as possible could reduce the lag and 
increase the economic returns of the RGGI program. 
A Region’s Pre-Existing Generating Mix Affects Economic Impacts 
Since power generation resources have different CO2 emission impacts – with coal-fired generation 
having higher combustion-related CO2 emissions than other electricity generating resources – the 
amount of coal in a particular state’s generating mix affects the costs of the RGGI program. Even so, 
every state experiences net positive benefits from RGGI, including in the more coal-heavy region 
(i.e., in the PJM states, New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland). 
RGGI’s First Three Years of Program Investments Point to Some Best Practices  
Based on our review of state program investments, it is clear that some states’ practices can serve as 
best practices for others. First, speeding up the timing of when RGGI auction proceeds are used 
reduces the lag between CO2 costs showing up in electricity prices and the time when benefits begin 
to flow to the region. Second, re-circulating RGGI auction proceeds back into the economy in the 
form of energy efficiency programs can dramatically increase the value of the RGGI program for 
electricity consumers and for the larger economy. Finally, standardizing the collection, measurement 
and verification of data on RGGI dollar flows could significantly improve the ability to quickly 
translate program lessons into improved program design. Our economic impact analysis involved 
significant effort to collect, organize, and process the data on how states disburse and spend RGGI 
allowance revenues and on the character of program impacts on various recipients in the larger 
economy. Greater consistency in data collection and reporting would add more transparency and 
accountability for these expenditures.  
                                                     
to September 2011 (from 25,165,100 to 25,091,700), the number of RGGI-related jobs (or, conversely, the potential loss of thousands of 
additional jobs absent RGGI) is significant.  Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/laus.pdf.   
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2. THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 
Overview and Purpose 
Starting with the first auction of CO2 allowances in 2008, ten states in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic 
regions initiated RGGI, a multi-state market-based program to reduce emissions of CO2. 11 The 
program created the country’s first mandatory program to cap emissions of CO2 from power 
generation sources, with the cap set initially at 188 million short tons of CO2 annually across the ten-
state RGGI region. The regional cap is apportioned to states in a manner based generally on emissions 
from the affected sources (fossil fuel power plants that are 25 megawatts or over in size), and in 
accordance with specific state allowance budgets agreed upon by the states. As originally designed, 
the cap would decline by 2.5 percent per year beginning in 2015, to reach an overall reduction of 10 
percent of CO2 emissions by 2018.12 Although they had the option to distribute allowances for free, 
the states decided to distribute the vast majority of CO2 emission allowances into the market through 
a centralized auction, administered by RGGI, Inc., the non-profit organization they set up to run the 
program. 
The states developed the RGGI program over several years, starting in late 2003, in order to begin to 
address the risks associated with climate change. The specific goal of RGGI is to seek stabilization 
and reduction of CO2 emissions within the signatory states, based on the conclusion among state 
signatories that: (1) climate change is occurring; (2) it poses serious potential risks to human health 
and the environment; (3) delay in addressing CO2 emissions will make later investments in mitigation 
and adaptation more difficult and costly; and (4) a market-based carbon allowance trading program 
will create strong incentives for the development of lower-emitting energy sources and energy 
efficiency, and reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels.13 
Market-Based Mechanism 
RGGI is a market-driven emissions control program. Similar to that of other market-based programs 
administered for control of nitrogen oxides (NOx) and sulfur dioxide (SO2), the foundation of the 
RGGI program is an annual cap on emissions of CO2 in aggregate for all affected sources. Affected or 
“regulated” sources in a given state generally include all fossil-fueled electric power generators with a 
capacity of equal to or greater than 25 megawatts. Program compliance is relatively straightforward: 
shortly after the end of each 3-year compliance period (with the first being 2009–2011), every 
affected source must retire a number of allowances equal to the total tons of CO2 emissions from the 
source over the three-year period (one allowance equals one ton of emissions).  
                                                     
11 The ten states are Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont. On May 26, 2011 New Jersey announced its intention to withdraw from the RGGI program, at the end of 2011. Baxter, 
Christopher, “Gov. Christie Announces N.J. Pulling Out of Regional Environmental Initiative,” May 26, 2011,  
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/05/gov_christie_to_announce_nj_pu.html.  
12 Information on RGGI is drawn from various fact sheets on the website of RGGI, Inc., the non-profit organization established by the states 
to administer the RGGI program. http://www.rggi.org/design/fact_sheets. 
13 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Memorandum of Understanding, December 20, 2005, pages 1-2. 
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The states’ selection of a market-based control program for CO2 emissions from the power sector 
reflects the history and success within this region of market-based programs established under the 
federal Clean Air Act for control of SO2 and NOx emissions. It is also a natural fit for the electric 
industry given the ease with which allowance costs can be rolled into competitive wholesale 
electricity market price signals. This mechanism allows prices to reflect CO2 emissions, leading over 
time to industry operational decisions (relating to power plant dispatch) and investment decisions that 
reflect the most efficient long-run compliance path for the industry. In this context, the use of a 
market-based control program for CO2 encourages efficiency in power dispatch decisions and long-
run efficiency for achieving compliance with the market-based cap on emissions.14 
The CO2 emissions cap is administered through limiting the quantity of allowances issued for a given 
year. For example, 188 million allowances were available for the year 2009. The owners of affected 
power plants generally obtain CO2 allowances by purchasing them through the initial auctions (held 
quarterly), or by purchasing/transferring them in a secondary market.15  
RGGI allows for flexible compliance in a number of ways. First, recognizing the long-lived nature of 
CO2 in the atmosphere, compliance is required not annually, but on a three-year basis. That is, 
sources can purchase, bank, and use allowances bought at any auction for a given compliance period 
within the three-year compliance period, and need only demonstrate compliance (through retiring 
allowances in amounts equal to emissions) shortly after the end of that same period. Second, sources 
can meet up to 3.3 percent of their CO2 compliance obligation through the purchase of offsets – 
greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction projects outside the power sector.  
Allowance Disbursement to the RGGI States 
Allowances are made available primarily through central auctions that are conducted quarterly by 
RGGI, Inc. on behalf of the RGGI states. An independent market monitor assesses the auctions to 
ensure that they are administered according to auction rules, and that there is no anti-competitive 
behavior in the market. Approximately 99 percent of allowances are initially distributed via RGGI 
auctions, with the remainder sold directly by selected states (Connecticut and New Jersey) to 
qualifying affected sources. Participation in the auctions is open to any company or person meeting 
qualification requirements (e.g., financial security requirements), with a ceiling of 25 percent placed 
on purchases by a single buyer or group of affiliated buyers in each auction. Proceeds from the 
quarterly auctions – which are determined by quantities sold and auction clearing price (subject to a 
reserve (floor) price that is currently $1.89 per allowance) – are distributed to states, and states 
determine how to use the funds.  
                                                     
14 In all three of the power regions where RGGI states are located, the wholesale power market has evolved over time into a comprehensive 
electricity market construct (including energy, capacity, and ancillary services) that shapes the dispatch of power plants in an efficient and 
reliable way in real time as well as affecting the near-term and long-term price signals for the addition of new generating capacity. These 
regions are centrally administered wholesale markets operated by three entities: ISO-New England (for the six New England states); the 
New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) (which is a single-state market); and PJM (for New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland, 
along with 10 other states and the District of Columbia outside of the RGGI MOU).  
15 In addition, Connecticut and New Jersey disburse a small amount of allowances through direct sales to qualifying emitters. 
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The initial auction occurred in September 2008, before the commencement of the compliance period 
in 2009; all 12.56 million allowances offered for sale were sold at a single clearing price of $3.07 per 
allowance.16 The most recent auction as of this writing occurred in September 2011, with 
approximately 18 percent of the 42.19 million allowances offered for sale selling for $1.89 per 
allowance.17 Thus during the first compliance period, allowance auction prices trended downward 
and ultimately reached the reserve price level, due primarily to the decrease in emissions associated 
with diminished economic output and lower-than expected power sector demand.  
Use of Auction Proceeds and Other Allowance Revenues 
The use of auction proceeds varies by state, consistent with enabling state legislation, regulation, and 
policy. Examples of how the states used their funds include investment in energy efficiency 
programs, investment in community-based or private-sector installation of renewable or advanced 
power generation systems, direct reductions in electricity bills, funding of state government 
operations through allocation to state general funds, education and job training programs, and 
administration of the RGGI program or other greenhouse gas reduction initiatives. How states have 
used the auction proceeds during the time period reviewed in this study (that is, the first compliance 
period, 2009–2011) is discussed in detail below.  
RGGI Program Review 
The RGGI program was designed with a number of specific elements of review and evaluation. In 
particular, the RGGI agreement provided for a comprehensive program review in 2012, which is 
currently underway. The comprehensive program was designed to review, at a minimum, program 
success and impacts, imports and emissions leakage, the integrity of the offset program, and whether 
additional reductions beyond 2018 should be implemented. 
                                                     
16 http://www.rggi.org/docs/rggi_press_9_29_2008.pdf. 
17 http://www.rggi.org/docs/Auction_13_Release_Report.pdf. 
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3. STUDY METHOD OF ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF RGGI PROGRAM TO DATE 
Overview 
From Q3 2008 through the present, the auction or direct sale of RGGI CO2 emission allowances has 
resulted in the collection and disbursement to states of nearly $1 billion. See Figure 1. 
Figure 1 
RGGI Allowance Proceeds by State 
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The purpose of our analysis is to follow this money and identify the economic impacts of its use. 
Namely, we track the path of RGGI-related dollars as they leave the pockets of power plant owners 
who buy CO2 allowances, show up in electricity prices and customer bills, make their way into state 
expenditure accounts, and then roll out into the economy in one way or another. This analysis is 
unique in this way: it focuses on the actual impacts of economic activity; known CO2 allowance 
prices; observable CO2 allowance proceeds ($912 million); dollars distributed to the RGGI states; 
actual state-government decisions about how to spend the allowance proceeds; measurable reductions 
in energy use from energy efficiency programs funded by RGGI dollars; traceable impacts of such 
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expenditures on prices within the power sector; and concrete value added to the economy. By 
carefully examining the states’ implementation of RGGI to date, based on real data about both the 
expenditures inside and outside of the electric sector, and value added from RGGI program 
implementation, we track the extent to which RGGI program implementation represents a positive or 
negative impact on the economies of the RGGI states. 
There were five major elements of our review, each of which is discussed in more detail in the 
sections that follow: 
1. We first established the scope and overall framework of the analysis, to create as much as 
was possible an integrated analytic framework that separates and highlights RGGI-state 
impacts based on known historical program implementation data (i.e., during the first 
compliance period), from other factors and impacts outside the region or associated with 
forecasts or projections. This scope of analysis thus included modeling of actual funds 
received and spent by the states, and actual impacts on electricity markets, as well as an 
assessment of the impacts of RGGI program expenditures on the larger economy. The 
analysis aimed at providing a better understanding of uses of funds by developing a number 
of illustrative case studies to provide some indication of the wide variety of programs that 
have been funded in the first compliance period.  
2. Next we conducted a thorough review of data and information on use of revenues 
collected from the sale of RGGI allowances. These data were gathered from public sources: 
RGGI, Inc. reports, RGGI state agency documentation, and other industry documents and 
studies of the RGGI program. We used these data to develop a comprehensive catalogue of 
how each state used its RGGI allowance proceeds, and supplemented this effort through 
comprehensive interviews with and collection of data from representatives of implementing 
agencies in the RGGI states. The purpose of this step was to track with as much accuracy as 
possible exactly how RGGI revenues have been allocated and disbursed over the first 
compliance period, how disbursed funds were used, and what the impacts were of associated 
program implementation. Part of this analysis resulted in information about the use of 
allowance proceeds that affected activity in the electric sector (e.g., how expenditures on 
energy efficiency programs affected the level of energy use in various portions of the day and 
in different seasons of the year) and in other parts of the economy (e.g., how those same 
energy efficiency programs affected buildings’ use of oil or natural gas for heating purposes; 
how different program expenditures provided job training, purchases of equipment, and so 
forth, as described further below).18  
3. Third, we modeled electric sector outcomes from both the incurrence of increased costs 
associated with affected facilities’ compliance obligations (namely, the purchase of 
allowances and pricing of power consistent with those CO2 allowance costs), and the effect of 
changes in electric generation and demand associated with the use of funds to spur 
                                                     
18 These various uses of allowance proceeds are described in the Appendix. 
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investment in energy efficiency and advanced energy technologies. Our electric sector 
analysis was conducted using the GE Multi-Area Production Simulation (MAPS) model.19 
4. Fourth, we modeled macroeconomic outcomes, combining electric sector outcomes – 
positive and negative – with expenditures in all sectors of the economy associated with the 
use of RGGI funds in the ten states. This produced an overall picture of how RGGI program 
implementation has affected the economy, including multiplier effects associated with the 
impacts on consumer electricity payments, power plant owners’ costs and revenues, and the 
flow of RGGI-related dollars through other sectors of the economy. Our macroeconomic 
analysis was conducted using the IMPLAN model.20 
5. Finally, we identified and collected information on specific examples of how RGGI funds 
were spent, and produced 11 case studies designed to provide an illustrative cross-section of 
how programs resulted in actual impacts on households, community, companies, and others 
in the RGGI region. These cases reveal only a small sampling of how the states used RGGI 
proceeds, the larger effects of which are tracked in the macroeconomic analysis.21 
It is clear from our program research and results that different investment vehicles have vastly 
different impacts from both economic and non-economic perspectives. Because our analysis focuses 
only on economic impacts, it does not shed light on all of the objectives and outcomes of the RGGI 
program (e.g., addressing climate change risk, etc.).   
Scope of Analysis 
Overview 
In order to carry out our analysis of economic impacts of RGGI, we ran power system dispatch and 
macroeconomic models under two scenarios: the “RGGI case,” which is effectively the world as it 
actually evolved; and the counterfactual “no-RGGI case,” which involves changes to model inputs 
and assumptions to create conditions as if the RGGI program never happened. The difference in 
economic impacts between the two cases reflects the incremental impacts of the RGGI program to 
date. 
In constructing the scope of our analysis, we were guided by three key objectives: First, we wanted to 
focus on impacts only within the RGGI states (the geographic perspective). Second, we wanted to 
identify near-term and longer-term impacts associated with RGGI’s implementation during the first 
compliance period only (2009–2011) (the temporal perspective). Third, we wanted results that were 
grounded as much as feasible in actual, known expenditures, programs, and impacts (the empirical 
perspective).  
                                                     
19 The MAPS model and our analysis of electric sector impacts are described in detail in the Appendix. 
20 The IMPLAN model and our analysis of macroeconomic impacts are described in detail in the Appendix. 
21 The case studies, along with the full list of all RGGI program grants we considered, are in the Appendix. 
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From a geographic perspective, we focused our analyses on the activities and impacts exclusively 
within the RGGI states. While some money from RGGI spending that flows outside of the RGGI 
states affects the economies of states outside the RGGI region (for example, for the manufacture of 
light bulbs or insulation used in energy efficiency programs, or flows of dollars to the federal 
government associated with changes in income), we did not try to capture or report those impacts in 
our analysis. Similarly, in the power system modeling, our evaluation of impacts on power plant 
owners (also referred to as producers or generators here) and energy consumers was limited to those 
located within RGGI states. 
From a temporal perspective, we focused our analysis on the first RGGI compliance period. We 
tracked the impacts of RGGI-related dollars associated with the first three years of implementation. 
This means that we included in power pricing the cost to power producers of obtaining RGGI 
allowances in the first three years, and we included in power and economic sectoral investments only 
RGGI revenues that were collected during the first three years of the program.  
Focusing on these initial three years of RGGI dollars required incorporating nuanced timing 
adjustments. We tracked actual dollars collected from power producers during the 13 auctions that 
have occurred to date: these 13 auctions took place from Q3 2008 through Q3 2011. The funds from 
these auctions flowed to the states immediately, with states spending them (or programming them for 
expenditures) during the 2009–2012 time period. Within the electric system, the impacts of these 
initial auctions show up during the 2009–2011 period, as power plant owners priced the value of CO2 
allowances into prices they bid in regional wholesale markets. The macroeconomic impacts occur 
over the time period that allowance proceeds are spent (2009–2012), but there are tail-end effects 
associated with the imprint of energy efficiency expenditures made during that period on energy use 
for the following decade (through 2021). We thus track these direct effects of RGGI to date in the 
near term (i.e., the first compliance period), and in the long term track indirect impacts from 
expenditure of RGGI dollars by the states (for energy efficiency expenditures from 2009–2012, and 
from the implications of those energy efficiency measures on electricity use from 2009–2021).  
Consequently, from the perspective of modeling data and assumptions, we focus our analysis on 
known quantities associated with actual results from the first three years. That is, we do not forecast 
allowance prices; we use actual allowance prices as they revealed themselves through the auctions. 
We do not estimate future program revenues, since we were focused on actual RGGI auction 
proceeds to date. We do not project how future revenues will be spent by states, since we rely entirely 
upon how the states have actually decided to spend allowance proceeds received to date. We make no 
assumptions about states’ participation in RGGI going forward. Nor do we project impacts associated 
with programs funded through RGGI dollars collected in future years.  
The goal of our analysis is thus to identify economic impacts associated with historical 
implementation: known allowance prices and revenues; known distribution of revenues to states; 
actual or committed expenditures associated with state proceeds; and observable impacts associated 
with past or current RGGI-funded program implementation. In this sense, our analysis should be 
viewed as a snapshot of impacts associated with a finite period – the initial compliance period – of 
RGGI program administration, and not a projection or forecast of how RGGI may, could, or should 
evolve. To accomplish our goal, however, we did have to establish what these programs meant from 
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an economic perspective, in order to create the “no-RGGI” counterfactual case, against which to 
compare the actual economy that included RGGI during the 2009–2011 time period.  
Data Collection and Processing 
Overview 
Our analysis began with the collection and processing of data related to RGGI program 
implementation in each of the ten states. Identifying and tracking the use of RGGI proceeds is 
fundamental to our analysis, yet it was somewhat challenging due to the newness of the RGGI 
program, as well as to the complexity of tracing dollars through each state’s different administrative 
channels. This process also involved the translating of expenditures for energy efficiency measures 
into impacts on power system energy consumption and electricity peak loads in various seasons and 
days of the year. 
In each state in the past three years, RGGI funds sometimes supported new programs in many 
functional areas of state government. In most cases, even the underlying state laws and regulations 
governing administration of the RGGI program were new, and the states needed to set up new 
programs with new state employees in new divisions. Reporting procedures and records had to be 
established and put into effect.  All of that has affected the availability and form of program-specific 
information from the states.  
In the end, we were able to obtain most of the necessary information from the states. Where 
information was missing or incomplete, we took successively deeper steps (including follow-up 
interviews with agency staff and reviews of enabling legislation and regulations) to fill in data holes, 
sort out inconsistencies, and arrive at a workably complete data set for use in the study.  
Data Gathering 
Our data gathering and processing effort focused on identifying the use of RGGI allowance proceeds 
in as complete and accurate a manner as possible, to ensure a good match between revenues collected 
and expenditures tracked. We gathered, processed, and audited the data using a methodological 
approach that “follows the money” through the sequence of steps that begin with the creation of a pot 
of auction proceeds that then goes to the states for programming and expenditure through grants of 
one form or another (see Figure 2). Once we were able to track monies into different expenditure 
pots, we then processed the result for input into the MAPS and IMPLAN models.  
Approach 
The first anchor point for our data analysis is the level of revenues collected through the quarterly 
auctions of allowances ($900.6 million), and through the direct sale of allowances ($11.8 million). 
This was the target amount of revenues that, in the end, we needed to match up with state program 
expenditures. Our first point of data collection and verification with states was with the collection of 
revenue information related to sales of allowances into the market, and then allocation of those 
revenues to states. Total revenue allocations to states are shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 2 
Representation of Dollar Flows from RGGI Auctions through State Spending Impacts 
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Much of the challenge in data collection and verification involved tracking the flow of money once 
received by the states through various programs, channels, and agencies. Once we knew the amounts 
allocated and released by states to programs, we then tracked dollar flows to determine whether and 
how the dollars were actually disbursed. We traced and categorized in some detail the actual use of 
program dollars for funding to various types of recipients, activities, measures, or completed 
installations (e.g., numbers of energy efficiency measures by type of measure and by type of 
customer).   
Finally, we identify the effects of the funded activities, programs, and investments. By “effects,” we 
mean the tangible results of the expenditures that are significant or important from the standpoint of 
measuring economic impact through the MAPS and IMPLAN modeling effort. For example, what are 
the annual household electricity savings, on- and off-peak, associated with an appliance rebate 
program to replace old air conditioners with new, efficient ones? How many MWh of generation will 
flow annually from a solar photovoltaic system installed on a capped municipal landfill using RGGI 
dollars? Identifying such effects involved (1) collecting data and estimates by states on such effects, 
(2) reviewing and processing these estimates for consistency of assumptions and calculations across 
 PAGE 17  
 Analysis Group 
 PAGE 18  
states for similar programs, and (3) applying “best-practice” estimation methods where data across 
states were missing, incomplete, or inconsistent. 
Process 
Our process for cataloguing the collection, allocation, disbursement, and use of RGGI allowance 
revenues involved three basic steps:  
 We first collected and reviewed all data on RGGI program expenditures and on estimated 
effects of RGGI-funded programs from all public sources. The public sources of information 
were RGGI, Inc., the state agencies, and various publicly available reports on the RGGI 
program. 
 We organized and recorded the data in a manner designed to achieve consistency in data 
documentation across the states. Based on this step, we developed a survey to support the 
gathering of data from states to fill in where there were holes in reported data gathered from 
public sources. 
 Using the existing public data and survey information collected through interviews with state 
officials, we obtained all of the remaining data available, and organized it for consistency. 
Since the information came from many sources, the data reflected varying levels of detail, 
requiring us to process the data to place expenditures into consistent spending categories 
across the RGGI states, and to format the data for input into the MAPS and IMPLAN models.  
Based on our review of the data, the similarities in spending vehicles across RGGI states, and the 
levels of disaggregation needed for model inputs, we divided program spending into six categories. 
These categories are described below, and expenditures by category for each electric market region 
(New England, New York, and PJM RGGI states22), as well as for the entire RGGI footprint, are 
presented in Figures 3 through 6. 
1) General Fund/State Government Funding – includes money used to fund state agencies, 
programs, and other expenses not necessarily tied to RGGI program activities, through 
use of RGGI allowance revenues as a contribution to meeting overall state budget 
requirements.  
2) Energy Efficiency and Other Utility Programs – described further below.  
3) Renewable Investment – includes grants to programs and investments focused on the 
development, distribution, and installation of renewable or advanced energy technologies 
(e.g., a program to support installation of rooftop photovoltaic systems).  
4) Education, Outreach, and Job Training – includes monies used for programs (i) to 
educate business and residential consumers about energy consumption and the 
                                                     
22 As described in further detail below, the ten RGGI states are located in three electrical regions: the six New England states are together 
part of the unified electric grid/market administered by the ISO-New England; New York has a single-state wholesale market/grid; and 
Delaware, Maryland and New Jersey are part of a larger electrical market administered by PJM. 
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availability of programs to reduce consumption, and (ii) train workers with new skills and 
knowledge in industries and activities that contribute to lowering energy use (e.g., energy 
efficiency measure installation) or the production and distribution of renewable or other 
advanced energy technologies.  
5) Direct Energy Bill Assistance – includes use of RGGI funds to reduce bills paid by 
consumers for electricity and heating/cooling. Most significantly, investments in this 
category were targeted to low-income households.  
6) Other GHG Reduction Programs and Program Administration – The GHG reduction 
programs include a variety of expenditures aimed at reducing GHG emissions [such as 
research and development grants for carbon emission abatement technologies, direct 
investment in “green” start-up companies, direct GHG emissions reduction measures 
(e.g., efforts to reduce vehicle miles traveled and programs to increase carbon 
sequestration), climate change adaption measures and investments in existing fossil-fuel 
fired power plants to make them cleaner and/or more efficient (e.g., installing pollution 
controls and installing technologies to increase plant efficiency)]. RGGI Program 
Administration refers to RGGI auction proceeds used by each RGGI state to cover costs 
associated with the administration of the state’s CO2 Budget Trading Program and/or 
related consumer benefit programs. 
Because so much of the RGGI funds were spent on energy efficiency (“EE”) measures, and because 
different measures lead to different impacts on consumers’ demand for electricity, we grouped 
information on energy efficiency programs into several expenditure categories. This enabled us to use 
the data at a more granular level in the MAPS and IMPLAN models. EE categories include the 
following:  
 Audits and Benchmarking – Expenditures associated with the energy auditing function (initial 
visits to homes or businesses to provide some initial EE measures and to refer the owner to 
additional EE programs and/or to estimate self-funding measures) and the measurement and 
verification of energy use and program impacts to guide future program design.  
 Installations and Retrofits – The vast majority of EE funds involved direct expenditures for 
installations and retrofits. Within this category, we collected data by program type (e.g., 
residential retrofit, residential new construction, appliances, commercial retrofit, commercial 
new construction). Disaggregation of information at this level was needed to be able to assign 
“load profiles” to the various types of EE programs for modeling program load reductions in 
the MAPS model. 
 Demand Response and Management of Consumption – Expenditures on demand response 
measures, smart meters, and the use of other technologies designed to manage customer 
consumption of electricity in response to various supply conditions. This includes programs 
where there is a dispatch signal provided to a consumer of electricity to modify consumption 
under certain conditions, technologies that inform consumers about electric price signals 
(which may lead to modified behavior), and other programs that can shift or curtail loads. 
 PAGE 19  
 Analysis Group 
Figure 3
Summary of RGGI Proceed Spending
All RGGI States
Figure 4
Summary of RGGI Proceed Spending
New England
Figure 5
Summary of RGGI Proceed Spending
New York
Figure 6
Summary of RGGI Proceed Spending
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Education & Outreach and Job Training
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Renewable Investment
Direct Bill Assistance
Source: Individual state reports and interviews.
Note: Certain grant programs may include multiple components, and are categorized in the figure above based on the largest 
share of spending.
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The amounts of funds spend by program category by region (and in the ten RGGI states as a whole) 
are show in Table 1, below. 
 
 PAGE 20  
 Analysis Group 
Table 1 
Spending of RGGI Proceeds by State and Category 
 
General 
Fund/State 
Government 
Funding
EE and other 
Utility Programs 
and Audits & 
Benchmarking
Renewable 
Investment
Education & 
Outreach and 
Job Training
Direct Bill 
Assistance
GHG Programs 
and Program 
Administration Total
Connecticut ‐$                    37,667,961$      10,705,482$  337,290$        ‐$                    3,020,516$      51,731,248$    
Maine ‐                      22,831,749         ‐                   ‐                   ‐                      4,398,768         27,230,517      
Massachusetts ‐                      133,960,304      325,324          3,108,774       17,083               5,093,587         142,505,072    
New Hampshire 9,272,116          21,483,151         ‐                   1,181,506       ‐                      998,939            32,935,712      
Rhode Island ‐                      13,210,854         ‐                   314,528          ‐                      744,155            14,269,538      
Vermont ‐                      6,496,814           ‐                   ‐                   ‐                      102,630            6,599,444         
New England Subtotal 9,272,116$       235,650,833$    11,030,806$  4,942,097$     17,083$             14,358,596$    275,271,531$  
New York 90,000,000$     163,660,609$    16,800,000$  8,600,000$     ‐$                    48,588,106$    327,648,716$  
New York Subtotal 90,000,000$     163,660,609$    16,800,000$  8,600,000$     ‐$                    48,588,106$    327,648,716$  
Delaware ‐$                    13,977,755$      ‐$                 ‐$                 1,663,210$       6,809,816$      22,450,780$    
Maryland 7,770,000          26,840,847         5,471,340       4,181,160       115,465,494     9,871,582         169,600,424    
New Jersey 74,950,622       ‐                       27,089,246     ‐                   10,185,525       6,069,154         118,294,547    
RGGI States in PJM Subtotal 82,720,622$     40,818,602$      32,560,586$  4,181,160$     127,314,229$   22,750,552$    310,345,751$  
All RGGI States 181,992,738$   440,130,044$    60,391,392$  17,723,257$  127,331,312$   85,697,254$    913,265,997$  
Source: Individual  state reports  and interviews.
Note: NY dollars  include interest earned in addition to proceeds  from the RGGI auctions.
 
Modeling Approach 
Overview 
Given that our goal was to track the impact on the economy of the states’ use of RGGI allowance 
proceeds, we needed to construct a counterfactual electric system that did not reflect RGGI funding 
and develop an analysis that followed the RGGI funds through the economy. We provide the details 
of our assessment tools in the Appendix, which describes the IMPLAN and MAPS models in greater 
detail. 
With respect to impacts on the general economy, RGGI allowance proceeds have two effects. First, 
when the states use RGGI proceeds to fund an activity (such as energy efficiency), those monies have 
a direct impact in the form of purchases of goods and services in the economy. Second, the 
compliance obligation and the use of RGGI proceeds create changes in the power sector, in the form 
of changes in power plant owners’ costs, prices bid into wholesale electricity markets, and consumer 
spending for power. In aggregate, these changes in spending lead to revenue gains and losses (to 
power plant owners) and gains and losses (to consumers), which, in turn, affect economic flows in the 
macroeconomy.  
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To estimate these impacts on the economies of RGGI states, we model changes to the electric system 
and macroeconomic outcomes. The general flow of data and modeling outcomes is depicted in Figure 7. 
Figure 7 
Flow of Data and Modeling Outcomes 
 
Various Other Forms 
of Program Funding
(Education, Direct 
Bill Assistance, 
Program Admin, etc)
RGGI Auctions
Purchases of CO2 
Allowances by Fossil‐
Fuel Generators 
Quarterly auction cycles
Fossil Fuel 
Generators 
Increase Market 
Bids to Reflect 
CO2 Costs
Auction 
Proceeds Spent 
by RGGI States
Dispatch Order 
of Changes for 
Some Power 
Plants
Lower  
Consumer 
Demand for 
Electricity
$ Electricity Price Effects $
Decreased Consumer Demand ↓
Increased Generator Costs ↑
Changing Dispatch Order ↑↓
Energy 
Efficiency and 
Renewable 
Project Funding
Macro‐economic 
impacts:
Direct effects of 
RGGI program 
spending, 
consumer gains, 
and producer 
loss
Indirect and 
induced effects 
of multiplier 
effects of gains 
and losses
Net Revenue Loss for 
Generators
ELECTRIC SYSTEM EFFECTS
MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS
ConsumersPower Plant Owners
Bill Reductions for 
Consumers
Our modeling approach combines analysis of power sector affects (through modeling using MAPS), 
and analysis of macroeconomic effects (through use of IMPLAN). The foundation of our modeling 
analysis is, in effect, a comparison between two scenarios run through the models. In the IMPLAN 
analysis, we start with economic relationships that exist among providers and users of goods and 
services in the ten RGGI states, and then we introduce the direct expenditures (RGGI proceeds) and 
the revenue gains and losses to electricity consumers and power producers. In the MAPS model, we 
run a dispatch of the ten-states’ power systems “with” and “without” RGGI, and include in each run 
the same core conditions: power system infrastructure both in place and as it evolves over the 
modeling period (that is, transmission configurations and power plant additions and retirements); 
local and regional forecasts of electric energy and peak load by service territory over the modeling 
period; projections of fuel prices and allowance prices for NOx and SO2; etc.  
The two cases in MAPS can be described as follows: 
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 RGGI Scenario – In the RGGI scenario, the power system is modeled as is. That is, the RGGI 
case represents the world as it has evolved with RGGI in place and operating. It includes all 
of the programs, measures, investments, and funding that are associated with the first three 
years of RGGI program implementation, and all of the impacts on the power system and 
economy associated with the use of RGGI funds. 
 No-RGGI Scenario – In order to create the counterfactual against which we compare and 
contrast the RGGI case, we create a scenario configured to represent the power system and 
economy as it would have progressed absent expenditure of RGGI-related dollars. In order to 
do this, we relied on all of the data and representations of RGGI investments and associated 
effects described in the previous section, and removed those investments and effects from the 
RGGI scenario. 
We then traced the dollar differences in these two MAPS runs (with and without RGGI) through the 
macroeconomic IMPLAN model to capture the impacts of these electric sector outcomes; we also 
injected funds related to the states’ direct expenditures of RGGI program dollars in IMPLAN.  
Modeling Timeframe 
Figure 8 captures in schematic form how RGGI program costs and effects are represented in the 
MAPS and IMPLAN modeling. More detail on how the modeling is carried out is presented in the 
Appendix, but in summary the items to note in this figure are the following:  
1. The 13 auctions (Q3 2008 through Q3 2011) provide CO2 allowances into the markets, which 
are then used by affected power plant owners during the first compliance period from 2009–
2011. During this period, CO2 allowances affected the prices at which fossil-fueled power 
plant owners offered to supply their power into regional electric energy markets, with offer 
prices also tied to their fuel cost (e.g., natural gas or coal or oil), variable operations and 
maintenance expense, and generating efficiency (heat rate). At times (when the affected 
producers are on the margin) the cost of CO2 allowances increases the wholesale price for 
power – and thus electricity costs – to all customers. These effects are represented as red 
blocks in Figure 8. This incremental impact of CO2 prices in electricity markets stops after 
this first three-year period; that is, our analysis does not make any assumption about the 
RGGI program going forward, which is important for isolating the effects of the first three 
years of the program.  
2. The money collected from CO2 allowance sales (from Q3 2008 through Q3 2011) are spent 
on various programs. These expenditures are represented as blue blocks in Figure 8. (Note 
that the lag between revenue collection from auctions in the first three years and program 
expenditures by the states means that some portion of revenues collected during that period is 
actually spent in the economy in 2012, with programming of the monies by the states 
reflecting decisions made in 2011. Consequently, the blue blocks extend into 2012.) These 
expenditures are one-time events in those years – program administration, rate relief to 
electric utility ratepayers, construction, maintenance or purchases, energy efficiency program 
implementation, energy audits or measurement, verification and benchmarking, education 
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investments, etc. These all represent single purchases or expenses that directly affect 
economic activity only in the year in which they occur. 
 
Figure 8 
Representation of RGGI Program Costs and Impacts through MAPS and IMPLAN Modeling 
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3. Some of these one-time expenditures (e.g., on CO2 allowances, on purchases of electricity, on 
expenditures of RGGI-funded activities) lead to impacts (e.g., energy use, energy costs, 
energy savings) beyond the year of incurrence. This results fundamentally from the use of 
RGGI funds on energy efficiency and new renewable generating capacity. Once made, such 
investments continue to produce reductions in load or shifting of generation for many years 
beyond the investment. This in turn affects how RGGI expenditures to date affect (a) current-
period and later-term revenues to owners of power plants (which, over the long term, realize 
negative impacts in the form of decreased revenues due to producing less power because 
demand is lower compared to the “no RGGI” case) and (b) current-period and later-term 
expenditures on electricity (and natural gas and oil for heating purposes) by consumers (who 
realize lower wholesale electricity prices and lower energy bills in the “with RGGI” case). 
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These long-term impacts of one-time expenditures are reflected both in changes to power 
system dispatch over the period of study and changes in economic activity over the same time 
period.  
By constructing the analysis in this way, we were able to isolate our measurement of impacts to 
“known” outcomes, with the assessment grounded in known information from the first compliance 
period, and with impacts limited to those occurring in the RGGI states.  
In the following sections, we summarize the power system and macroeconomic models, and highlight 
a few key factors of the modeling approach that help to interpret the results.  
Power Sector Analysis 
RGGI has two primary effects in wholesale power markets. First, marginal power prices are at times 
increased by the additional CO2 allowance cost to affected (fossil-fired) power generating facilities. 
Second, load, demand, and marginal prices are at times decreased by energy efficiency measures 
installed with the use of RGGI allowance proceeds.  
Using the MAPS power system dispatch simulation model, we quantified these net impacts on 
regional and local system loads, power prices, and revenues to power producers associated with 
implementation of the RGGI program. (See the Appendix for a detailed description of the MAPS 
modeling platform, whose core logic is explained briefly below.) These relationships are summarized 
in Figure 9. Using MAPS, we created the “with RGGI” case (benchmarking the modeling results to 
the actual electric output) and then constructed a counterfactual “no-RGGI” case. Comparing the 
results of the two cases provided information about the incremental effect of RGGI on power system 
users and producers.   
Figure 9 
Diagram of MAPS Modeling Inputs and Outputs 
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Traditional cost-minimizing strategies in the dispatch of power systems involve use of production-
cost information to determine which power plants operate at different times of the day to meet 
changing load conditions. In competitive wholesale electric market regions like the Northeast and 
Mid-Atlantic regions, decisions on which power plants to turn on and off are made based primarily on 
bids submitted by power plant owners indicating the price at which they are willing to supply power 
into the markets. Provided the market is sufficiently competitive, price bids should approximate 
marginal production costs of the facilities in the system. Generally, prices in wholesale markets are 
set hourly based on the last generating unit dispatched – that is, the most expensive unit that was 
needed to meet hourly load. 
The GE MAPS power system model is configured to comprehensively simulate the dispatch of the 
power system on an hourly basis based on power plant marginal costs, subject to various operational 
and transmission system constraints that can alter dispatch order (and thus prices) in real time. The 
MAPS model simulates system dispatch based on, and reflecting: (1) the operational characteristics 
and marginal production costs of every generating facility in the power region being studied (in this 
case, New England, New York, and PJM); (2) the configuration of, and limits on transfers of power 
across, the transmission system, comprising every transmission line and other system components in 
place; and (3) algorithms designed to reflect the operational constraints of power plants, such as the 
time it takes to start units and to ramp them up to various power levels, the minimum time they must 
be on, and the minimum time they must be off. Given the level of detail in how MAPS represents the 
power system – that is, down to very small power plants and specific transmission system 
components and limits – it is able to model and represent power prices, unit output, emissions, 
consumer costs, producer revenues and other factors on an hour-by-hour basis, and with a high degree 
of geographic resolution (that is, down to a utility’s service territory, or a specific substation).  
Given this level of detail, we are able to model investments in energy efficiency and the development 
of new generation using RGGI funds at a detailed state- and utility-specific level. This allowed us to 
capture the impact of such investments on the prices that consumers pay – and that power producers 
are paid – on hourly and locational bases. As shown in Figure 9 above, we simulated the dispatch of 
the three regional power systems that contain the RGGI states for each hour of the modeling period 
(January 2009  through December 2021) for both the “with RGGI” and “no-RGGI” cases. Based on 
the output of those two cases, we calculate changes in (1) unit dispatch, (2) wholesale electric prices, 
(3) payments to power producers, and (4) payments by consumers. 
We used the MAPS output and associated calculations of changes in generator and consumer prices, 
revenues, and payments in two ways. First, the data are used to describe the impacts on generators 
and consumers from the perspective of the electric system only – that is, how much more or less do 
power plant owners get paid as a result of RGGI program investment effects? How much more or less 
do consumers pay for electricity as a result of RGGI program investment effects? How does that 
differ by state and region? How do these electric system impacts change with time? The impact on 
power plant owners and consumers associated with the RGGI program – which is focused on the 
electric sector only – is an important consideration in program design and effectiveness. 
Additionally, we used the output data from MAPS as inputs to the IMPLAN model. From a 
macroeconomic perspective, the end result of changes in power system costs, revenues, and payments 
are (a) changes in economic conditions for power plant owners (affecting their ability to spend and 
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save in the general economy), and (b) changes in the level of disposable income enjoyed by 
consumers as a result of RGGI (e.g., relating to their having higher or lower electric bills), which 
affects their spending and saving in the general economy. Consequently, changes in these two factors 
serve as inputs to the general economic model (described below), along with other categories of 
RGGI program investment. 
Macroeconomic Model 
As previously noted, changes in power producer revenues and consumer incomes associated with 
electric system impacts lead to these larger direct and indirect impacts in the economy as a whole. 
Other economic impacts also need to be taken into account: those related to the actual direct spending 
of RGGI auction proceeds by government agencies (and in turn, indirectly by the recipients of the 
RGGI-funded grants). Additionally, these other impacts result from the multiplier effects of these 
changes in consumer income and producer revenues and from the purchases of goods and services in 
the economy by those who receive RGGI-related grants from the states.  
Consequently, in order to model macroeconomic impacts, we combine the changed revenues and 
spending that come from the MAPS model with all categories of the direct investment of RGGI 
allowance revenues in the macroeconomic model, IMPLAN. The relationship between MAPS and 
IMPLAN, and the source of additional inputs to IMPLAN, are shown in Figure 7 (and explained in 
more detail in the Appendix). 
IMPLAN is a social accounting/input-output model that attempts to replicate the structure and 
functioning of a specific economy, and is widely used in public and private sector economic impact 
analyses. It estimates the effects on a regional economy of a change in economic activity by using 
baseline information capturing the relationships among businesses and consumers in the economy 
based on historical economic survey data that track flows of money through the economy. IMPLAN 
tracks dollars spent in a region, including dollars that circulate within it (e.g., transfers of dollars from 
consumers to producers), dollars that flow into it (e.g., purchases of goods and services from outside 
the local economy), and dollars that flow outside of it (e.g., payments to the federal government). The 
model thus examines inflows, outflows, and interactions within the economy under study. 
The IMPLAN model allows one to investigate interactions in the RGGI region and the individual 
states within it, and to calculate various economic impacts in that economy when a new activity (such 
as investments in energy efficiency, use of funds for government programs supported by the general 
fund, assistance in helping customers pay their energy bills, or lost revenues for owners of power 
plants) involves money flows around the economy. Specifically, the model captures various impacts, 
including:  
 Employment impacts (the total number of jobs created or lost);  
 Income impacts (the total change in income to employees that results from the economic activity); 
and  
 “Value-added” impacts (the total economic value added to the economy, which reflects the gross 
economic output of the area less the cost of the inputs).  
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In our analysis, we report employment impacts but focus primarily on the “value-added” impacts 
produced by the model, reflecting the combination of the following economic effects of the change in 
money flow associated with RGGI: 
 Direct effects: the initial set of inputs that are being introduced into the economy. In our study, 
this included the direct effects of RGGI on owners of power plants as a whole, on energy 
“consumers” (end users of electricity, natural gas and heating oil), and use of RGGI proceeds to 
buy goods and services in the economy (e.g., investment in energy efficiency, work training 
programs, contributions to the general fund, bill payment assistance for low-income consumers).  
 Indirect effects: the new demand for local goods, services and jobs as a result of the new activity, 
such as the purchase of labor to retrofit buildings with energy efficient measures, or to train 
workers in these skills. Some RGGI auction proceeds lead to payments for things outside the 
local region (e.g., the purchase of efficient lighting equipment or solar panels manufactured 
outside of the RGGI region), and thus represents a way that such funds do not stay within the 
local economy after having been generated by power plant owners’ purchases of CO2 allowances. 
 Induced effects: the increased spending of workers resulting from income earned from direct and 
indirect economic activity.  
Modeling Factors 
To calculate the impacts of RGGI, we needed to make a number of simplifying assumptions about the 
systems and economies that we are studying. These assumptions relate to: (1) the relevant 
(geographic, temporal) boundaries around the analysis, (2) the methods for putting dollar flows 
occurring during different time periods into a common economic framework; (3) key modeling 
parameters in the power system; and so forth.  We highlight a few of these below.  
Focus on the First Compliance Period 
First, the analysis assumes neither pricing for carbon nor any additional RGGI-funded investments in 
energy efficiency or generation beyond the program’s first compliance period. For modeling purposes 
alone, and in order to isolate the incremental effects of the first three years of RGGI, we made no 
assumptions about RGGI continuing beyond 2011. Further, we do not assume that there is a price on 
carbon through other regional, state, or federal legislation at any point during the modeling period 
(through 2021). Neither assumption should be interpreted as a judgment or expectation about the 
likelihood one way or the other of continued RGGI program implementation, or the emergence of a 
national carbon pricing regime. Constructing the analysis in this way limits the impact on power plant 
owner revenues and consumer savings associated with continued increases in energy efficiency and 
new carbon-free generation investments relative to what will actually result over time, should RGGI 
continue forward in some form in the region. 
Discount Rate 
Our analysis involves the assessment of costs (e.g., expenditures and investments, decreases in 
revenues) and benefits (e.g., lower electricity bills for consumers, added value in the economy) that 
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occur in different periods of time. We examine the flow of dollars associated with the purchase of CO2 
emissions allowances in 13 RGGI auctions that took place in Q3 2008 through Q3 2011, the impact of 
these allowances in electricity prices in 2009–2011, and the impact of RGGI-funded programs on 
electric system outcomes and the macroeconomy from 2009–2021. Thus, the study period, in one way 
or another, spans from 2008–2021. 
To compare these benefits and costs properly, we discount all dollar flows into net present values as of 
2011. We calculate the net present value by applying an appropriate discount rate to dollar flows in 
different years, and then subtracting the sum total of discounted costs from the sum total of discounted 
benefits.  
Our analysis requires choosing an appropriate discount rate, one that must reflect the preferences for 
money today versus in the future for various constituencies – power producers, who are largely private 
enterprises, consumers (e.g., households, businesses, government energy users), and others. RGGI-
funded activities add value to the macroeconomy of a wide range of actors in the Northeast and Mid-
Atlantic region. Choice of appropriate discount rate needs to properly reflect the opportunity costs of 
these various private and public entities in society.  
We have chosen to use two discount rates, as recommended in situations where an analysis involves 
money flows to various entities in society over different periods of time, especially when “there is a 
significant difference in the timing of costs and benefits, such as with policies that require large initial 
outlays or that have long delays before benefits are realized.”23 First, we calculate net present values 
using a “social” or public discount rate of 3 percent. Second, we also calculate net present values using 
the opportunity cost of capital to private entities (at 7 percent).24 These choices are described in more 
detail in the Appendix. 
In our results, we do not choose one or the other discount rate as being the one appropriate for review 
and interpretation of RGGI’s economic impacts. Since the use of RGGI allowance proceeds has some 
characteristics that would suggest use of the public rate, yet others that would suggest use of the private 
rate, we present results using the public rate in the body of this report, while noting the private rate 
results and providing further details in the Appendix. Importantly, while the use of different rates 
affects the magnitude of impacts we found, in no case does the use of one rate over the other 
qualitatively change our findings. 
Timing of Economic Impacts that Affect the Power Sector 
The focus on actual expenditures and impacts in only the first three years of program implementation, 
in combination with the application of a social and private discount rate, ends up highlighting the fact 
that RGGI benefits lag behind RGGI costs. The costs show up in electric system impacts to consumers 
in the first three years of the program, with benefits flowing to them over the entire study period 
                                                     
23 “Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA 240-R-10-001, December 2010, page 6-5 
(hereafter, “EPA Guidelines”).  
24 EPA Guidelines, page 6-23. 
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(through 2021). Conversely, the benefits flow to owners of power plants early on, with outer-year 
effects diminishing those net positive revenues received in the first compliance period.   
Indeed, there is a significant lag between the incurrence of costs in the “with RGGI” case and the 
timeframe in which installation of energy efficiency measures funded through RGGI allowance 
revenues begin to affect demand, supply, and prices in the outer years.  
Representation of Energy Efficiency Programs 
A significant percentage of RGGI allowance proceeds went to funding investments in energy efficiency 
programs across the RGGI states. Programs included auditing and benchmarking efforts, investments in 
retrofit measures for existing homes (e.g., window and door treatments, insulation); residential lighting 
and appliance change-out (replacing refrigerators, washers, dryers or air conditioners with more 
efficient ones); commercial building shell, lighting, and equipment replacement; and new building 
measures (e.g., funding for more efficient materials and appliances at the time of new construction). 
Given these various uses of RGGI funds for EE, there are two major analytic challenges in the MAPS 
modeling effort: First, we needed to determine an assumed duration or lifetime for savings from 
particular measures (for example, for how long does installation of insulation continue to produce 
savings?). Second, we needed to develop a way to map annual energy and peak load savings onto 
estimates of impacts on load in every hour of the year.   
In all of the RGGI states where EE programs are in place, there is substantial documentation of 
estimates of annual energy savings and, in some cases, contributions to reductions in peak loads. There 
is a long history of EE implementation and measurement and verification efforts to support engineering 
and statistical estimates of how the installation of a given EE measure actually translates into annual 
savings, distribution of savings across the hours of the year, and measure lifetimes. We relied on this 
literature to calculate the lifetime and load-impact characteristics of the various EE programs funded by 
RGGI dollars. 
Where available, we reviewed on a program-by-program, measure-by-measure basis, the estimates of 
measure lives developed by states and utilities and currently used in programs, based on the past few 
decades’ of experience in administering EE programs. We calculated weighted average measure life 
assumed by states and utilities across the range of measures, and found that virtually all programs have 
measure lives in excess of ten years; on average, measure lives were 12–13 years. In our modeling, we 
conservatively truncated measure savings at ten years. 
In some areas of the RGGI region, states have estimated how EE-related savings break down on a 
seasonal basis (summer or winter) and on a daily basis (on- or off-peak). Based upon a review of these 
estimates where available, we developed representative distributions of savings across seasonal and 
daily categories, and assigned annual energy savings to a given distribution on a company-by-company 
and program-by-program (and in some cases, measure-by-measure) basis.  
Using these characterizations of EE program impacts, we calculated hourly adjustments to load for each 
EE program, and in aggregate for all programs used these to adjust hourly load in the MAPS model. 
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4. RESULTS  
Overview 
Although the RGGI program was developed in response to concerns over the socioeconomic and 
environmental risks associated with climate change, our analysis focused exclusively on economic 
impacts of the program as a result of its first three years of operation. Thus, it sheds light only on 
economic issues, and does not address the many other objectives that underpinned the RGGI states’ 
adoption of the program.25 
By contrast with the approach used in many other allowance trading programs (such as ones developed 
under the Clean Air Act for SO2 and NOx emissions), the RGGI states decided to distribute virtually all of 
the CO2 allowances through quarterly auctions, with auction revenues distributed to states in accordance 
with the RGGI state budget allocation.26 Auctioning allowances and distributing allowance proceeds to 
states in this way had an important impact on program outcomes since it meant, in effect, that the public 
benefitted by transferring the value of allowances to market at market prices (rather than for free, as was 
done in the SO2 and NOx allowance programs). The decisions to distribute allowances in this manner 
reflected complex decisions by each state which allowed for the use of auction proceeds to pursue specific 
energy- and non-energy-related public policies there was an opportunity to both address some of the 
potential cost impacts of RGGI program implementation, and to pursue other key public policy 
objectives.  
The first 13 RGGI auctions produced $912 million dollars. This sum includes just over $900 million from 
the auctioning of allowances, and just under $12 million from the direct sale of allowances to affected 
sources.27 These allowances revenues were distributed to (or held by) states in the following amounts:  
                                                     
25 The RGGI States’ Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) has a preamble that recognizes the common objectives of the states’ own policies 
“to conserve, improve, and protect their natural resources and environment in order to enhance the health, safety, and welfare of their residents 
consistent with continued overall economic growth and to maintain a safe and reliable electric power supply system.” Additionally, the MOU 
declares as common goal of the states of “reducing our dependence on imported fossil fuels will enhance the region’s economy by augmenting 
the region’s energy security and by retaining energy spending and investments in the region…” Additionally, the original RGGI MOU starts with 
the states’ premises that: (1) climate change is occurring; (2) it poses serious potential risks to human health and the environment (including 
severe droughts and floods, changes in forests and fisheries, sea level rise); (3) delay in addressing greenhouse gas emissions will make later 
investments in mitigation and adaptation more difficult and costly; and (4) a market-based carbon allowance trading program will create strong 
incentives for the development of lower-emitting energy sources and energy efficiency, and reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels. RGGI 
States’ Memorandum of Understanding, December 20, 2005, pp. 1-2. 
26 Where allowances were not distributed via auction, they were sold directly to affected sources, again retaining the value of the allowances sold 
for public purpose.  
27 This includes all revenues collected from allowance auctions and direct sales through the first 13 auctions. The fourteenth and final auction in 
the first compliance period is scheduled to happen on December 7, 2011, and so could not be accounted for in our analysis. 
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 $52 million for Connecticut 
 $22 million for Delaware 
 $27 million for Maine 
 $170 million for Maryland 
 $143 million for Massachusetts 
 $33 million for New Hampshire 
 $118 million for New Jersey 
 $327 million for New York 
 $14 million for Rhode Island 
 $7 million for Vermont 
 
See Figure 1 for proceeds received in each year by the ten states. 
These dollars ended up having three types of economic impacts:   
1.   Impact on the general economy. This is the “bottom line” result of our analysis. These impacts 
include effects on overall economic value in the RGGI states from the following economic losses 
and gains: 
 the direct investment of RGGI allowance proceeds in various economic sectors (such as 
spending in government agencies, payments to individuals for training and educational 
initiatives, and direct payments to consumers of electricity, direct payments to builders 
and contractors installing energy efficiency measures or renewable systems); and  
 the net impact on power plant owner revenues and electricity consumer payments tied 
specifically to changes in the price of power and the quantity of power 
generated/consumed as a result of reinvesting dollars to reduce energy consumption or 
increase non-emitting generation.  
These economic “value added” impacts flow from both the direct effect of injecting RGGI dollars 
into various economic sectors, and the additional effects that flow from additional – or secondary – 
economic activity “induced” by the effects of direct injection of RGGI dollars. 
2. Impact on the electric sector. These are observable impacts, which are part of the large impacts 
on the general economy noted above. Electric sector impacts include overall changes to power 
plant owner revenue streams (from increased costs for obtaining and using CO2 allowances and 
changes in the price and quantity of power sales); and overall changes to payments by consumers 
for the purchase of electricity (from decreased consumption and changes in market prices).  
3. Other effects. These include changes in employment and payments for fuel that flow from the 
impacts of the use of RGGI allowance revenues in the electric system and general economy.  
Impacts 
Our high-level results for each of the ten states, and for the RGGI region as a whole, are summarized in 
Table 2. This summary points out the bottom line: RGGI has produced positive economic outcomes for 
each state and for the region as a whole.  
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Table 2 
Summary of Economic Impacts, by RGGI State and Region 
Discounting Dollars Using a Social Discount Rate 
 
 
The RGGI States Together 
Impact on the General Economy 
Overall, RGGI’s first compliance period produced a net present value economic benefit of $1.6 billion, 
using a public discount rate.28   
Generally speaking, this positive impact results from: the positive direct and induced impacts associated 
with the injection of RGGI dollars into economic goods and services; the net positive impacts associated 
with consumer savings on electric and non-electric energy supply expenditures; and the net negative 
impacts associated with a loss of power plant owner net revenues from allowance purchases and power 
                                                     
28 Using a 7 percent private discount rate, the NPV benefit is $1.0 billion. 
Value Added
1 
(millions of $) Employment
2
Connecticut 189$                                                        1,309                                                      
Maine 92                                                             918                                                          
Massachusetts 498                                                           3,791                                                      
New Hampshire 17                                                             458                                                          
Rhode Island 69                                                             567                                                          
Vermont 22                                                             195                                                          
New England Subtotal 888$                                                        7,237                                                      
New York 326$                                                        4,620                                                      
New York Subtotal 326$                                                        4,620                                                      
Delaware 63$                                                           535                                                          
Maryland 127                                                           1,370                                                      
New Jersey 151                                                           1,772                                                      
RGGI States in PJM Subtotal 341$                                                        3,676                                                      
Regional  Impact3 57$                                                          601                                                        
Grand Total 1,612$                                                     16,135                                                    
Notes:
[2] Employment represents job‐years as outputted from IMPLAN.
[4] Results  are discounted to 2011 dollars using a 3% social  discount rate.
[3] Regional  Impact reflects  the indirect and induced impacts resulting within the RGGI region as  a result of state dollar 
impacts.
[1] Value Added reflects  the actual  economic value added to the state and regional  economies, and therefore does  not 
include the costs  of goods purchased from or manufactured outside of the state or region.
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system dispatch and price effects (see below). The first two more than offset the latter, resulting in a net 
positive economic benefit. 
Impact on the Electric Sector 
From a consumer perspective, RGGI program impacts are net positive over the study period. Although 
CO2 allowances tend to raise electricity prices in the near term,29 there is also a lowering of prices over 
time because the states invested so much of the allowance proceeds on energy efficiency programs. RGGI 
expenditures on energy efficiency programs increase the opportunities for consumers to reduce their 
energy use and their energy bills. This occurs primarily for electricity, but also for fuel consumed for 
heating. Lower overall electric load levels resulting from RGGI-funded energy efficiency places 
downward pressure on electricity prices and energy payments for all electricity consumers, relative to a 
no-RGGI case. After the early impacts of small electricity price increases, consumers gain because their 
overall electricity bills go down as a result of this investment in energy efficiency. All told, electricity 
consumers overall – households, businesses, government users, and others – enjoy a net gain of nearly 
$1.1 billion, as their overall electric bills drop over time.30   
This reflects average savings of approximately $25 for residential consumers, $181 for commercial 
consumers, and $2,493 for industrial consumers over the study period. Consumers who participate in an 
energy efficiency program funded by RGGI proceeds actually experience a level of savings much higher 
than the average savings for all consumers.  
Note, that due to the energy efficiency programs supported by RGGI funds, energy consumers also save 
nearly $174 million through RGGI programs focused on reducing consumption of oil and natural gas heat 
homes; these savings are above and beyond those experienced in the electric system. 
Figure 10 summarizes the overall gains to consumers by state and region, including bill savings in 
electricity, gas, and oil markets. 
 
                                                     
29 During the 2009–2011 period, we estimate that RGGI increased consumers’ overall payments for electricity by 0.7 percent; over the long run, 
however, investment of RGGI proceeds, which states used to support a variety of economic activity (of which approximately 48 percent went to 
support energy efficiency programs) lead to net savings in electricity bills to all consumers in all states, relative to an electric system that did not 
include RGGI for the 2009–2011 period.  
30 Under a 7 percent private discount rate, gains to electricity consumers overall are nearly $600 million. 
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Figure 10 
Consumer Bill Reductions by State and Region (2011$) 
 
 
From the perspective of the power generation sector, the RGGI program leads to an overall drop (on an 
NPV basis) in electric market revenues, amounting to approximately $1.6 billion.31 Although power plant 
owners have to purchase CO2 allowances, they recover all of their early expenditures during the 2009–
2011 period; in the long run, however, RGGI-driven energy efficiency leads to lower sales of electricity 
which ends up eroding power plant owners’ electric market revenues. The net impact to electric power 
plant owners is summarized by state and region in Figure 11. However, these impacts are not distributed 
equally across power plant owners; RGGI affords a competitive advantage to power plants with lower 
CO2 emissions. 
Combining the power plant owner and consumer changes, net electric market impacts are negative for the 
RGGI region as a whole, amounting to a net loss of slightly over $500 million.32  
                                                     
31 Under a 7 percent private discount rate, the net decrease in revenues for power plant owners is $1.3 billion. 
32 Under a 7 percent private discount rate, net electric market impacts are a net loss of just under $720 billion. 
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Figure 11 
Net Revenue Change for Power Plant Owners (2011$) 
 
 
Non-Dollar Impacts 
In addition to an economic benefit, the use of RGGI proceeds results in a positive employment impact 
through an increase of approximately 16,000 new job-years, and reduced payments to out-of-region 
providers of fossil fuels by just over $765 million.33   
Overall Impact 
Overall, RGGI’s first compliance period produced a net present value economic benefit of $1.6 billion, 
using a public discount rate.34 As previously mentioned, this includes electric sector impacts to 
consumers and power plant owners, in addition to the non-electric benefits and program spending that 
result from state spending of RGGI proceeds. As these individual impacts ripple through the economy, 
                                                     
33 Under a 7 percent private discount rate, fossil fuel payments to out-of-region providers decreased by slightly over $755 million. 
34 Using a 7 percent private discount rate, the NPV benefit is $1.0 billion. 
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they have the net effect of producing positive economic value. This can be seen in Figure 12, which 
shows the direct, indirect, and induced economic impacts to the ten-state region from the individual 
components described above. 
Figure 12 
Net Economic Impacts for the Ten State RGGI Region 
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Regional Differences 
Because the ten RGGI states fall into three electrical regions, each with a common electric market, we 
also analyzed the impacts of RGGI on a regional basis. The three electric regions are: the New England 
states (with a market operated by ISO-NE); New York (with a market administered by NYISO); and 
Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey (all part of the larger regional market administered by PJM). Figure 
13 highlights the RGGI states included in each region.  
Figure 13 
RGGI States by Region 
 
 
Every region experienced net positive macroeconomic effects. Even so, there are significant variations in 
both the overall level of impact and the magnitude of impact within each category, in each region.  
Of the three regions, only in New England do the savings to electricity consumers outweigh the reduction 
in revenues by power generators. This is due to a combination of factors – most notably the much-higher 
level of investment in energy efficiency with RGGI allowance proceeds than the other regions. On the 
other hand, the higher level of direct spending on government funding and direct bill assistance in the 
New York and PJM RGGI states leads to relatively higher levels of economic return in the form of direct, 
indirect and induced macroeconomic impacts. 
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New England  
In New England, the overall macroeconomic impacts are large: almost $900 million to the six-state 
region.35 These effects include net positive electric sector impacts (see above) and the net positive 
impacts of direct spending on programs, rebates, administrative obligations, and government programs. 
See Figure 14. 
Figure 14 
Net Economic Impacts for the States in New England (2011$) 
 
 
As shown, net negative impacts to power producers36 are offset by net positive impacts on consumer 
spending for electric and non-electric energy services.37 Although the net electricity price increases to 
                                                     
35 Under a 7 percent private discount rate, net economic impacts in New England are just over $675 million. 
36 From the perspective of New England’s power generation sector, RGGI program compliance during the first compliance period decreased 
supplier revenues on a net present value basis by approximately $640 million. These reductions come in the form of costs incurred to purchase 
allowance that exceeded the recovery of such costs in wholesale markets, an overall reduced level of revenue due to the combination of lower 
overall load levels (due to energy efficiency investments) and lower prices for power sold, and reduced capacity market revenues. 
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New England consumers from 2009–2011 were relatively small (0.6 percent), the long-term gains more 
than offset these initial increases in electricity bills and also offset the net revenue losses to power 
producers. These combine with the direct and induced impacts associated with the injection of RGGI 
dollars into the purchase of economic goods and services with positive multiplier effects on the New 
England economy.  
Additionally, RGGI proceeds end up producing positive employment impacts, amounting to an increase 
of approximately 7,200 new job-years in New England, and reduced payments to out-of-region providers 
of fossil fuels of approximately $210 million.38 
New York  
RGGI also resulted in positive economic value to the New York economy, amounting to $325 million.39 
The positive gains from recirculating RGGI funds through the economic offset the net negative impacts 
experienced in the electric sector. The overall result and the pieces contributing to it are presented in 
Figure 15.  
                                                     
37 From the perspective of the New England residential and business energy consumer, the impact of the reduced consumption and price impacts 
on electricity consumers is a net present value benefit of approximately $720 million across the region. Consumers that participate in an energy 
efficiency program funded by RGGI proceeds would experience a level of savings much higher than the average savings for all consumers. In 
addition, consumers save approximately $38 million through RGGI programs focused on reducing consumption of oil and natural gas to heat 
homes in New England. 
38 Under a 7 percent private discount rate, fossil fuel payments to out-of-region providers decrease by approximately $195 million in New 
England.  
39 Under a 7 percent private discount rate, net economic impacts in New York are approximately $125 million. 
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Figure 15 
Net Economic Impacts for New York (2011$) 
 
 
Although the net electricity price increases to New York consumers from 2009–2011 were relatively 
small (0.8 percent), because New York spent much of its RGGI funds outside the electric sector, the 
positive gains fell outside of the electric market impacts. (New York spent a large amount of RGGI funds 
for general fund purposes, in addition to supporting energy efficiency programs.) While electricity 
consumers enjoyed over time additional bill savings through reduced electricity purchases,40 these 
savings did not offset the net present value of revenue loss experienced by power plant owners over the 
modeling period.41  
                                                     
40 From the perspective of the New York residential and business energy consumer, the impact of the reduced consumption and price impacts on 
electricity consumers is a net present value benefit of approximately $145 million across the region. Consumers that participate in an energy 
efficiency program funded by RGGI proceeds would experience a level of savings much higher than the average savings for all consumers. In 
addition, consumers save approximately $85 million through RGGI programs focused on reducing consumption of oil and natural gas to heat 
homes in New York. 
41 From the perspective of New York’s power generation sector, RGGI program compliance during the first compliance period decreased 
supplier revenues on a net present value basis by approximately $430 million. These reductions come in the form of costs incurred to purchase 
allowance that exceeded the recovery of such costs in wholesale markets, an overall reduced level of revenue due to the combination of lower 
overall load levels (due to energy efficiency investments) and lower prices for power sold, and reduced capacity market revenues. 
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In addition to an economic benefit, RGGI proceeds led to programs producing approximately 4,600 job-
years in the region, and reduced payments to out-of-region providers of fossil fuels by approximately 
$120 million.42 
RGGI States in PJM  
The overall impact of RGGI on the economies of the PJM states (Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey) 
was also positive, with $341 million in added value to these three states.43 These impacts reflect the 
combined effects on the electric sector and the use of RGGI allowance proceeds on programs, rebates, 
administrative obligations, and government functions. The overall result and the pieces contributing to it 
are presented in Figure 16. 
Figure 16 
Net Economic Impacts for the RGGI States in PJM (2011$) 
 
 
                                                     
42 Under a 7 percent private discount rate, fossil fuel payments to out-of-region providers decrease by approximately $115 million in New York.  
43 Under a 7 percent private discount rate, net economic impacts in Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey are approximately $180 million. 
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Consumers experienced longer term savings in electricity44 and energy bills that offset the minor 
increases (0.7 percent) in electricity bills during 2009–2011. These savings were not large enough to fully 
offset the net revenue losses to power plant owners.45 Even so, the overall macroeconomic impacts of 
RGGI-funded program expenditures did offset the revenue losses to producers. 
Additionally, RGGI-funded programs resulted in a positive employment impact amounting to 
approximately 3,700 job-years in the region. RGGI also reduced payments to out-of-region providers of 
fossil fuels by approximately $435 million.46  
Observations 
These outcomes suggest a number of themes about the RGGI experience to date. Some are important for 
providing the RGGI states with information about how the policy is performing relative to some (but not 
all) of its original goals. The observations are also relevant to other states and national policy makers if 
and when they decide to adopt a CO2 control program.   
Mandatory, Market-Based Carbon Control Mechanisms are Functioning Properly and Can 
Deliver Positive Economic Benefits 
Based on the initial three years of experience from the nation’s first mandatory carbon control program, 
market-based programs are providing positive economic impacts while meeting emission objectives. The 
pricing of carbon in Northeast and Mid-Atlantic electricity markets has been seamless from an operational 
point of view, and successful from an economic perspective.  
Our review of the first three-year compliance period from the first market-based carbon control program 
in the country found positive economic impacts. This result holds whether or not one believes there are 
other reasons for or benefits from carbon control (e.g., addressing climate change risks). The economic 
impacts we studied flow from the revenues generated from the sale of allowances, and how those 
revenues were redistributed in the economies of the RGGI states.  
The use of RGGI allowance revenues has produced positive economic impacts while administration of the 
RGGI program has proceeded smoothly. Thirteen auctions have been held, and the auctions resulted in 
the distribution of the majority of available allowances. Allowances have been traded in the secondary 
market throughout the first compliance period, and the market monitor has found no evidence of market 
power in the RGGI auctions or the secondary market. Allowance revenues were quickly and efficiently 
distributed to states, and states have disbursed nearly all of the allowance revenues for various uses. The 
                                                     
44 From the perspective of the PJM RGGI states’ residential and business energy consumer, the impact of the reduced consumption and price 
impacts on electricity consumers is a net present value benefit of approximately $235 million across the region. Consumers that participate in an 
energy efficiency program funded by RGGI proceeds would experience a level of savings much higher than the average savings for all 
consumers. In addition, consumers save approximately $50 million through RGGI programs focused on reducing consumption of oil and natural 
gas to heat homes in the PJM RGGI states. 
45 From the perspective of the power generation sector in the PJM RGGI states, RGGI program compliance during the first compliance period 
decreased supplier revenues on a net present value basis by approximately $540 million. These reductions come in the form of costs incurred to 
purchase allowance that exceeded the recovery of such costs in wholesale markets, an overall reduced level of revenue due to the combination of 
lower overall load levels (due to energy efficiency investments) and lower prices for power sold, and reduced capacity market revenues. 
46 Under a 7 percent private discount rate, fossil fuel payments to out-of-region providers decrease by approximately $450 million in Delaware, 
Maryland, and New Jersey.  
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carbon cap established by RGGI has been met (in part because of stagnant economic conditions).47 RGGI, 
Inc. and the states have effectively tracked the use of allowance proceeds, and states continue to work 
cooperatively towards evolution of the program.  
In short, based on a review of RGGI’s first three years, it would seem that the design, administration, and 
implementation of a market-based carbon control mechanism can be an effective way to control carbon 
emissions, while potentially providing additional economic and policy benefits. 
The States Have Used CO2 Allowance Proceeds Creatively – Supporting Diverse Policy 
and Economic Outcomes  
The states’ use of allowance proceeds not only provides economic benefits, but also has helped them meet 
a wide variety of social, fiscal, and environmental policy goals, such as addressing state and municipal 
budget challenges, assisting low-income customers, achieving advanced energy policy goals, and 
restoring wetlands, among other things. While they started RGGI to address the impacts of climate 
change, they used auction proceeds to advance a wide variety of public policy interests of the states 
beyond mitigation of climate change risks, while achieving this economic benefit.  
While we focus solely on economic benefit, we know that state interests legitimately go beyond this. We 
do not mean to suggest or imply that states should necessarily focus exclusively on economic impacts 
when deciding the proper use of allowance proceeds within a state’s economic, environmental, and 
financial context. In fact, the evidence indicates that states have allocated RGGI funds to advance a 
number of different public policy objectives. For example, while the use of proceeds to provide rate relief 
for low-income customers may have a smaller multiplier effect in the economy than investments in 
energy efficiency, it 
supports an important 
public policy objective to 
assist customers that face 
default or increasing bill 
arrearages, and whose 
expenses for energy 
services are generally a 
disproportionate 
percentage of household 
expenses relative to non-
low-income customers. 
Similarly, the retention of 
proceeds in the General 
Fund of a given state may 
help preserve critical 
                                                     
47 RGGI, Inc. has reported that between 2008 and 2009, electric generation from RGGI-affected electric generation sources decreased by 17.9 
million MWh, or 9.1 percent. During that same time period CO2 emissions from RGGI electric generation sources decreased by 27.6 million short 
tons, or 18.4 percent. “CO2 Emissions from Electricity Generation and Imports in the 10-State Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: 2009 
Monitoring Report,” RGGI, Inc., September 14, 2011. 
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state agency programs and services that otherwise would have to be reduced or eliminated in the face of 
budget challenges.  
Finally, a common theme across many states is the use of RGGI proceeds as seed investments to 
communities or companies for the installation of renewable energy projects, in order to promote 
development of advanced energy sources and provide support for municipalities and businesses. These 
investments meet multiple policy objectives not necessarily or completely captured in a straight-up 
economic impact analysis. Consequently, by focusing on differences among allocation methods from the 
perspective of economic impacts only, we do not mean to suggest that that should be the only basis for 
determining the best use of RGGI allowance proceeds.   
RGGI Reduces the Region’s Payments for Out-of-State Fossil Fuels 
RGGI helped lower the total dollars these states sent outside their region in the form of payments for fuel. 
The generating capacity mix in New England, New York, and the PJM RGGI states includes nuclear, 
hydro, and renewable resources in addition to the fossil-fueled resources that are subject to the 
requirements of RGGI. Note, in each of these regions, generation from the combined coal, oil, and natural 
gas fleets dominates the resource mix. However, nearly all of the fossil fuels that power these resources 
come from outside the RGGI states. This means that each year a significant portion of payments to power 
producers leaves the region in the form of payments for fuel coming from the U.S. Gulf, other coal-
producing regions, Canada, or overseas. 
Implementation of RGGI and the use of RGGI proceeds for energy efficiency and new renewable power 
production, through reducing generation and shifting the generation mix towards non-fossil resources 
(compared to the “without RGGI” case), reduces the flow of dollars that essentially pay for fossil fuels 
used in power production in the RGGI states.  
The Design of the CO2 Market in the RGGI States Affected the Size, Character, and 
Distribution of Public Benefits 
The joint decision by the RGGI states to make their CO2 allowances available to the market through a 
unified auction ended up generating substantial revenues for public use. This approach transferred 
emissions rights from the public sector to the private sector at a monetary cost (rather than transferring 
them for free). Had these allowances been given away for free, the states would not have had the benefit 
of the auction proceeds and instead would have transferred that economic value to owners of power plants 
(which, in the RGGI region, are merchant generators, not owned by electric distribution utilities). In the 
end, the cap level, the design of the auction mechanism, and the depressed economy meant that meeting 
the RGGI cap was not challenging, and CO2 allowance prices decreased over time. This made it harder 
for power plant owners to recoup investment in purchasing allowances, and has reduced the funding 
available for public investment.  
Notably, for a power plant owner, the value of an allowance – once in hand – is the same whether that 
allowance was received for free or purchased via auction. That is, the plant operator faces the same 
economic decision to price his/her power to recover the opportunity cost of the allowance, whether that 
owner bought or was given an allowance. Either way, the cost of generating power and emitting a ton of 
CO2 is equal to the price of an allowance, either by needing to purchase it, or by losing the opportunity to 
sell it. However, how the allowances are distributed does affect who captures the initial value of the 
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emission rights that allowances under a cap represents, and what the ultimate economic and policy impact 
of the program will be. 
Previous market-based emission control programs for NOx and SO2 have distributed allowances for free 
to the affected sources through formulas tied to historical heat input, emissions, or electrical output. This 
form of allowance allocation transfers the value of the allowance to the plant owner. In contrast, the joint 
decision by the RGGI states to make their allowances available to the market through a unified auction 
administered on behalf of the states retained the value of emission rights for the benefit of public use. 
Over the course of the auctions held during the first compliance period, this generated substantial 
revenues for use by state governments to meet public policy objectives. The use of these revenues, in turn, 
substantially influenced the fact that RGGI program implementation over the first compliance period lead 
to net economic benefits and a wide array of ancillary public policy achievements. 
In the end, the cap level, the design of the auction mechanism, and the sinking economy meant that 
meeting the RGGI cap was less challenging than it otherwise might have been over these three years, and 
allowance prices and revenues have decreased over time. While this may have reduced the overall 
magnitude of benefits achieved, it does not change the fact that the decision on whether to auction or 
allocate for free the allowances under a market-based allowance trading program was a key decision point 
affecting the relative economic and policy impact of the RGGI program over the first three years.  
How Allowance Proceeds Are Used Affects Their Economic Impacts 
The RGGI MOU fully anticipates – if not encourages – states to place different weights on economic, 
environmental, social, energy security, and other goals as they implement the program. The states have 
used their RGGI dollars very differently, in ways that affect the net benefits within the electric sector and 
in the larger state economy. While all states originally committed to using at least 25 percent of auction 
proceeds for “public benefit or strategic energy” purposes,48 some states contributed a much larger 
amount to those ends. 
But from a strictly economic perspective, some uses of proceeds clearly deliver economic returns more 
readily and substantially than others. For example, RGGI-funded expenditures on energy efficiency 
depress regional electrical demand, power prices, and consumer payments for electricity. This benefits all 
consumers through downward pressure on wholesale prices, even as it particularly benefits those 
consumers that actually take advantage of such programs, implement energy efficiency measures, and 
lower both their overall energy use and monthly energy bills. These savings stay in the pockets of 
electricity users directly. But there are also positive macroeconomic impacts as well: the lower energy 
costs flow through the economy as collateral reductions in natural gas and oil in buildings and increased 
consumer disposable income (from fewer dollars spent on energy bills), lower payments to out-of-state 
energy suppliers, and increased local spending or savings. Consequently, there are multiple ways that 
investments in energy efficiency lead to positive economic impacts; this reinvestment thus stands out as 
                                                     
48 The RGGI MOU states that “Consumer benefit or strategic energy purposes include the use of the allowances to promote energy efficiency, to 
directly mitigate electricity ratepayer impacts, to promote renewable or non-carbon-emitting energy technologies, to stimulate or reward 
investment in the development of innovative carbon emissions abatement technologies with significant carbon reduction potential, and/or to fund 
administration of this Program.” 
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the most economically beneficial use of RGGI dollars. Other uses also provide macroeconomic benefits, 
even if they do not show up in the consumers’ pockets in the form of lower energy bills. 
RGGI Produced New Jobs  
Taking into account consumer gains, power plant owners’ losses, and net positive economic impacts, 
RGGI led to overall job increases. Some may be permanent jobs; others may be part-time or temporary. 
But the net effect is that, according to our analysis, the first three years of RGGI will lead to over 16,000 
new job-years, with each of the ten states showing net job additions.  
In the context of the entire workforce in the ten-state RGGI region, 16,000 new job-years is small (about 
one tenth of one percent of the total employment in September 2011). But considering the fact that the ten 
states’ civilian labor force dropped by 73,400 from September 2010 to September 2011 (from 25,165,100 
to 25,091,700), the jobs produced by RGGI spending (or, conversely, the absence of thousands of 
additional jobs, had RGGI not been in place) is significant.49   
Jobs related to RGGI activities are located around the economy, with examples including engineers who 
perform efficiency audits; workers who install energy efficiency measures in commercial buildings; staff 
performing teacher training on energy issues; the workers in state-funded programs that might have been 
cut had a state not used RGGI funds to close budget gaps. 
Timing Differences in Program Costs Versus Benefits Affects Results 
Costs associated with RGGI program implementation in the first compliance period were incurred by 
power generators – and to the extent possible passed on to consumers as incurred – during the years 
2009–2011. Yet, positive economic impacts associated with the distribution and spending of allowance 
proceeds can lag these incurred costs by a year or more in many states. This is in part due simply to the 
time it takes to collect auction and allowance sale revenues, transfer them to states, distribute them to 
disbursement agencies, disburse the funds, make investments, and put the resulting resources, measures, 
or installations into service. Differences in lag times among the states affect results in a non-trivial way.  
In addition, while the costs are incurred and passed on immediately, many of the economic impacts are 
stretched out over a relatively long period. For example, energy efficiency measures installed using RGGI 
allowance proceeds produce consumer savings, on average, for over 10 years; new renewable resources 
put into operation using RGGI proceeds continue to produce power for decades.50  
Because the estimation of economic impacts over time involves discounting costs and benefits that occur 
in different timeframes, lags, or delays in program administration and installations tend to diminish the 
estimated net present value economic impact of RGGI proceed investment. Deliberate efforts by states to 
re-circulate RGGI allowance revenues back into the economy as quickly as possible could reduce the lag 
effects and increase the economic returns of the RGGI programs.  
                                                     
49 Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/laus.pdf.   
50 As explained in more detail earlier, we truncate our economic analysis of program investments at ten years. 
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Value Added in the Economy for State Funding, Bill Reductions, and Education Strongly 
Outweigh the Direct and Induced Effects of Power Generator Revenue Loss 
RGGI’s impacts stretched in various corners of the economy. RGGI funds were spent on economic 
activities affecting the electric sector, other energy uses (e.g., natural gas and heating oil), support for 
low-income residents to meet their energy bills, educational activities, and general fund support. The 
positive economic multipliers associated with these expenditures contributed to net positive effects of the 
program for the RGGI states. These gains are larger than the direct impacts on the electric sector, where 
there were net positive consumer impacts but net revenue losses to power plant owners, from an NPV 
point of view.   
Given the complex relationships within economies, the multiplier effects of the economic gains ends up 
having larger impacts that those attributable to power plant owners’ revenue losses. For example, in the 
power generation sector, each $1 million of revenue loss leads to negative impacts on the economy – in 
the form of direct and induced effects – of approximately the same $1 million. By contrast, $1 million of 
added contribution to the general fund leads to positive impacts on the economy of approximately $1.2 
million; $1 million going to directly reduce consumer electricity bills or into energy education programs 
generates positive economic impacts of approximately $1.6 and $1.2 million, respectively (see Figure 17). 
The relative magnitude of these economic multipliers strongly influences the overall positive economic 
impact of RGGI implementation in the first compliance period.  
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Figure 17 
Average Multiplier Effects for RGGI Program Spending Categories 
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allocated in the states.   
 
A Region’s Pre-Existing Generating Mix Affects Economic Impacts 
Since power generation resources have different CO2 emission impacts – with coal-fired generation 
having higher combustion-related CO2 emissions than other electricity generating resources – the amount 
of coal in a particular state’s generating mix affects the costs of the RGGI program. Even so, every state 
experiences net positive benefits from RGGI, including in the more coal-heavy region (i.e., in the PJM 
states (New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland)). 
RGGI’s First 3 Years of Program Investments Point to Some Best Practices  
Based on our review of state program investments, it is clear that some states’ practices can serve as best 
practices for others. First, speeding up the timing of when RGGI auction proceeds are used reduces the 
lag between CO2 costs showing up in electricity prices and the time when benefits begin to flow to the 
region. Second, re-circulating RGGI auction proceeds back into the economy in the form of energy 
efficiency programs can dramatically increase the value of the RGGI program for electricity consumers 
and for the larger economy.  
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Finally, standardizing the collection, measurement and verification of data on RGGI dollar flows could 
significantly improve the ability to quickly translate program lessons into improved program design. Our 
economic impact analysis involved significant effort to collect, organize, and process the data on how 
states disburse and spend RGGI allowance revenues and on the character of program impacts on various 
recipients in the larger economy. The states and RGGI, Inc. have done a good job tracking expenditures 
and identifying or estimating program impacts, but there remain important differences in the level of 
detail of tracked data, collection of information on the effects of funded programs on energy generation 
and consumption, and the assumptions used to measure impacts with program implementation. Future 
program design efforts would be greatly facilitated by continued efforts to standardize the collection and 
centralization of data on the use of RGGI proceeds, the application of consistent reporting formats and 
underlying assumptions regarding program impacts, and the measurement and verification of results. 
